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DEVOLUTION OF A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER IN
COLORADO, REVISITED
By Lucy MARSH YEE*
INTRODUCTION
"Nothing pertaining to the devolution of a possibility of rev-
erter would be gained by a further study of the chain of title [in
School Dist. No. Six v. Russell]"2 according to Professor Thomp-
son G. Marsh. But if an unruly student should persist in studying
that chain, he or she would be astonished. Contrary to prevalent
academic belief,3 it has not yet been decided-by School Dist.
No. Six v. Russell4 or by any other Colorado case-whether a
possibility of reverter may be devised in Colorado. Since other
jurisdictions are divided on this issue,' it is by no means certain
which way the Colorado courts will go. Thus although there are
those who believe that "[t]he law of future interests seems to
have begun in the late thirteenth century, and to have been com-
pleted by the late sixteenth century , , there are still a few
developments to be made in Colorado.
It will therefore be the purpose of this article, first, to demon-
strate that it has not yet, in fact, been decided that a possibility
of reverter may be devised in Colorado. Second, the major Colo-
rado decisions on the subject will be studied in an attempt to
indicate just what has presently been determined in Colorado
concerning the possibility of reverter and the closely related, but
significantly different, right of entry for condition broken. Fi-
nally, a few illustrations will be offered to indicate some differ-
ences in the ways in which possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry for condition broken have been used in Colorado.
* Adjunct Professor, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1963, Smith College;
J.D., 1966, University of Michigan Law School.
This was the title used by Professor Thompson G. Marsh for a discussion of School
Dist. No. 6 v. Russell, 156 Colo. 75, 396 P.2d 929 (1964), in Marsh, Devolution of a




156 Colo. 75, 396 P.2d 929 (1964).
Holding that a possibility of reverter may be devised are Lacy v. Montgomery, 181
Pa. Super. 640, 124 A.2d 492 (1956) (dictum); Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d
448 (1950). Contra, Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 106 S.E.2d 913 (1959); Upington v.
Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896).
Comment, Proposed Restrictions on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry,
34 Miss. L.J. 176 (1963).
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I. School Dist. No. Six v. Russell REVISITED
It has been stated that School Dist. No. Six v. Russell consti-
tuted Colorado's first decision that a possibility of reverter may
be devised.7 Russell was an action by the school district to have
title to certain real property quieted in the district. Mary Sander,
one of the defendants named in the quiet title action who ap-
peared and sought to have the title quieted in her, won.'
The original deed to the school district was from Herbert A.
Russell.' The deed contained the provision that "it is understood
and agreed that if the above described land is abandoned by the
said second parties and not used for school purposes then the
above described land reverts to the party of the first part."'10
Professor Marsh has aptly pointed out that this is a "hybrid.""
He states that if the deed had said,
"unto the said party of the second part its heirs and assigns, so long
as the land is used for school purposes, and no longer, whereupon it
shall revert to the party of the first part and his heirs . . ." the
grantor would have had a possibility of reverter.
If the deed had said, "unto the said party of the second part its
heirs and assigns, but if the land is abandoned by the said party and
not used for school purposes then the party of the first part and his
heirs shall have the power to terminate the estate hereby granted,"
the grantee would have had an estate in fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent, and the grantor would have had a power of
termination"2 [here called a right of entry for condition broken].
But since the language of the provision was ambiguous, as so
many such provisions are, the court used the test of purpose' 3 and
determined that the provision in question created a possibility of
reverter. 4 However, by the time the possibility of reverter would
have caused the land to revert to the grantor in this case, the
grantor was dead. Thus the question arose as to who was entitled
to the benefit of the possibility of reverter when the school ceased
to use the land for school purposes.
To answer this question, one must check the chain of title
through which the possibility of reverter must have passed. This
Marsh at 401.
156 Colo. at 84, 396 P.2d at 933.
Id. at 76, 396 P.2d at 929.
I0 d.
1 Marsh at 396.
12 Id.
'3 See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.6 (1952).
" 156 Colo. at 81, 396 P.2d at 932.
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was found by Professor Marsh to have been included in Appendix










Deed, Russell to School District.
Herbert A. Russell dies intestate, with
widow, Agnes F. Russell, as sole heir.
Agnes F. Russell dies testate, leaving a
brother, David M. Bell, and sister,
Jane B. Darling, with residue to Jane
B. Darling.
Jane B. Darling dies testate, leaving
her residuary estate to her heirs, Mort
W. Darling (husband), and children
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner.
Mort W. Darling dies testate with resi-
duary estate to his heirs, Dewey L.
Darling, Ray W. Darling, and Satia
May Turner.
School discontinued at school site but
possession retained by School District.
School District files complaint for
quiet title.
Sander records October 26, 1962 Quit
Claim Deed from David M. Bell,
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner to Sander. 5
chain of title, Professor Marsh has asserted
that "the decision of this case [quieting title in Sander], in-
cluded, by necessary inference, the first decision that a possibility
of reverter was devisable in Colorado."' 6 But since the Professor
himself has always advocated scepticism, let us closely examine
that idea.
Under the theory that a possibility of reverter is devisable in
Colorado we would find the following chain of title:
March 11, 1890 Deed, Russell to School District, re-
serving a possibility of reverter in the
grantor.
June 4, 1930 Possibility of reverter passes by intes-
tacy to Agnes F. Russell.
Marsh at 399-400.









Jane B. Darling receives the possibility
of reverter by devise (as a tenant in
severalty).
Mort W. Darling, Dewey L. Darling,
Ray W. Darling, and Satia May
Turner receive the possibility of rev-
erter by devise (as tenants in common
or as joint tenants, according to the
terms of the will).
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner receive their
father's share of the possibility of rev-
erter by devise (again as tenants in
common or as joint tenants, according
to the terms of the will).
School discontinued at school site.
Land automatically reverts to the de-
visees of the possibility of reverter
-here Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Dar-
ling, and Satia May Turner.
School District files complaint for
quiet title.
Sander records October 26, 1962 Quit
Claim Deed from David M. Bell,
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner to Sander.
Therefore if a possibility of reverter is devisable, Sander ends up
with the full title to the land.
But what if the court had held that the possibility of reverter
could not have been transferred by devise, but only by inheri-




Deed, Russell to School District, re-
serving a possibility of reverter in the
grantor.
Possibility of reverter passes by intes-
tacy to Agnes F. Russell.
David M. Bell and Jane B. Darling,
evidently the only heirs of Agnes F.
Russell, each take a one-half interest
in the possibility of reverter as tenants
in coparcenary, by inheritance."
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-103 (1973).
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May 12, 1955 Mort W. Darling, Dewey L. Darling,
Ray W. Darling, and Satia May
Turner, the heirs of Jane B. Darling,
inherit her one-half interest, again tak-
ing as tenants in coparcenary. 8 (Mort
has a one-quarter interest as surviving
spouse, and the children divide the
other one-quarter interest, each thus
taking a one-twelfth interest in the
possibility of reverter.9)
Aug. 10, 1955 Mort W. Darling's one-quarter interest
passes by inheritance to his heirs, the
three children, who take as coparce-
ners-each child thereby acquiring
another one-twelfth interest, giving
each child a total of a one-sixth inter-
est in the possibility of reverter.
June 1960 School discontinued at school site.
Land automatically reverts, and is
owned by the following persons in the
following shares:
David M . Bell ............ 1/2
Dewey L. Darling ......... 1/6
Ray W. Darling ........... 1/6
Satia May Turner ......... 1/6
May 1, 1962 School District files complaint for
quiet title.
Nov. 5, 1962 Sander records October 26, 1962 Quit
Claim Deed from David M. Bell,
Dewey L. Darling, Ray W. Darling,
and Satia May Turner to Sander.
Sander again ends up with full title to the land! Because Sander
could take full title either under the theory that a possibility of
reverter can be devised, or under the theory that a possibility can
only be inherited, it is not possible to determine that "the deci-
sion of this case included, by necessary inference, the first deci-
sion that a possibility of reverter was devisable in Colorado.""°





must follow the cautious example of the attorney in School Dist.
No. Six v. Russell who insisted upon obtaining a quit claim deed
from David M. Bell, although Bell would have had no interest if
the possibility of reverter had been devisable. For clearer guide-
lines, one must simply wait for a definitive decision by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court.
But as one waits, it might prove worthwhile to consider the
right of entry for condition broken and the possibility of reverter
more closely, both as to the general similarities and differences
between the two interests, and as to the special qualities which
both may have in Colorado.
II. THE RIGHT OF ENTRY FOR CONDITION BROKEN AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
A. General Similarities
Both the right of entry for condition broken and the possibil-
ity of reverter were known to the early common law.2' In fact,
Gray asserted that the Statute Quia Emptores in 1290 had elimi-
nated the ability to create a possibility of reverter, though the
ability to create a right of entry for condition broken was unaf-
fected thereby. 2 Despite Gray, however, both the right of entry
for condition broken and the possibility of reverter are today rec-
ognized both in the United States in general and in Colorado in
particular.
At common law neither the right of entry for condition bro-
ken nor the possibility of reverter could be devised or alienated,
except in a few very limited situations. 23
In the United States, both interests are considered to be
unaffected by the Rule Against Perpetuities. 2 Whether this is
2 See Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Re-entry, 22
B.U.L. REv. 43 (1942); Comment, The Devisibility of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights
of Entry for Condition Broken, 7 ARK. L. REV. 390 (1952); 51 HARv. L. REv. 1113 (1938);
27 MICH. L. REV. 346 (1928); 32 MICH. L. REv. 415 (1933).
" J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 30-31 (4th ed. 1942).
u "Neither a possibility of reverter nor a right of entry was assignable at common
law." Roberts, supra note 21, at 44. Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 101, 106 S.E.2d 913,
916 (1958): "[Tlhe possibility of reverter is an interest too nebulous, under the common
law concept, to be devised or conveyed." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 160 (1936): "Except
as stated in sec. 161 the owner of a power of termination [here called a right for entry for
condition broken] in land has no power to transfer his interest, or any part thereof, by a
conveyance inter vivos." See § 161 for three very limited exceptions.
24 Prince v. Charles Ilfeld Co., 72 N.M. 351, 383 P.2d 827 (1963); Commercial Nat'l
Bank v. Martin, 185 Kan. 116, 340 P.2d 899 (1959); E. KING, FUTURE INTERESTS IN
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because each interest is considered vested upon creation,25 or
whether it is simply because American courts have declined to
apply the Rule Against Perpetuities to these interests,"6 is open
to discussion. But the fact remains that in the United States both
interests, being unaffected by the Rule Against Perpetuities, may
last forever.
B. Major Differences
The first important difference between a right of entry for
condition broken and a possibility of reverter is in the words used
to create the interest. A right of entry27 should be created by such
words as "but if . .. then the grantor shall have the right to
reenter the premises, and this deed shall thereby become null and
void." Failure to include specific words reserving a right of entry
in the grantor may be disastrous."
A possibility of reverter, on the other hand, should be created
by such words as "so long as . . . and no longer, and then to
revert to the grantor." 9 It has been held that the grantor need not
say, specifically, that the land is to revert. The mere use of the
words, "so long as" or "as long as," may be sufficient to create a
COLORADO 24 (1950); Comment, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter- The Perpet-
ual Title Cloud-A Need for Legislative Limitation, 71 DICK. L. REv. 349 (1966).
25 King, Future Interests in Colorado, 20 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 227, 248 (1948): "A
possibility of reverter is a vested interest. It is not subject to the rule against perpetuities."
J . GRAY, supra note 22, at § 304:
Though rights of entry for condition broken are within both the letter and
the spirit of the Rule against Perpetuities; though there is nothing in the
history of the Rule to exempt them from its operation; though they are held
to be subject to it in England; though the practical inconvenience of exclud-
ing them is very great .. .yet in America conditions violating the Rule
against Perpetuities have been repeatedly upheld, and forfeitures for their
breach enforced.
The right of entry for condition broken may also be called a power of termination.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 160 (1936); the estate which is subject to a right of entry for
condition broken may be called a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. L. SIMES,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 14, at 30 (2d ed. 1966).
11 Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 390 Ill. 619, 626, 61 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1945), held
that "equity will not aid a forfeiture where no right of re-entry is provided in the cove-
nant." But see West v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969):
[A]n express reverter clause need not be present, but if a consideration of
all the language of the deed shows an intention to create a condition, then
upon the failure to comply with the condition the grantor in the deed will
have a right of reentry.
Other typical words are "while," "until," "for the purpose of," "to be used for," or
similar expressions of a duration of time. The estate which is subject to a possibility of
reverter may be described as "a fee simple on a special limitation," "a fee simple deter-
minable," or a "base or qualified fee." See City of Klamath Falls v. Bell, 7 Ore. App. 330,
490 P.2d 515 (1971).
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possibility of reverter in the grantor in some jurisdictions, 0 al-
though the result might be opposite in other jurisdictions .3
The second crucial difference between the right of entry for
condition broken and the possibility of reverter is the method of
enforcement. A holder of a right of entry for condition broken
must assert his right, or the prior estate will simply continue in
the hands of the grantee.32 However, although it is agreed that
assertion of the right is necessary, there is some uncertainty as
to precisely what acts will be sufficient to constitute such an
assertion." The holder of a possibility of reverter, on the other
hand, need do nothing to enforce his possibility of reverter. The
possibility of reverter comes into effect automatically. 3 When the
land subject to a possibility of reverter is no longer used for a
church, for example, the title automatically reverts to the gran-
tor 5.3 The grantor need not do anything.
The third difference between the two interests is in the
applicability of the statute of limitations. A typical statute of
* "The words, 'as long as' are words of art creating a determinable fee with a possibil-
ity of reverter." Lindsay v. Wigal, 145 Ind. App. 338, 339, 250 N.E.2d 755, 756 (1969). No
other words of limitation were there used, and there was no specific mention of reverter.
31 Hagaman v. Board of Educ., 117 N.J. Super. 446, 285 A.2d 63 (1971). The clause
read, "It is the understanding of the parties ... that the hereinabove described land is
conveyed solely for the purpose of being used for the . . . erection and maintenance of a
public school or schools .... " Id. at 450, 285 A.2d at 65. The court held that "[in the
present case there are no words indicating an intent to create a fee simple determinable
or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. There are no words creating either a
right of re-entry or a possibility of a reversion." Id. at 454, 285 A.2d at 67.
32 "[T he power of termination does not take effect in possession on the breach of
the condition, but only when the owner of such power of termination, thereafter, by
appropriate acts, indicates his election to forfeit. ... L. SiMES, supra note 27, at 30. See
Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, 123 P.2d 412 (1942); A. GULLIVER, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1959).
1 It is not entirely clear just what actions will constitute an "assertion" of the right
of entry for condition broken.
It is generally held today that a physical entry on the land is not required
... . What the holder of a right of entry must do in lieu of entering is not
too clear under modern law. However, there is substantial support for the
proposition that bringing a suit to recover the land is sufficient.
A. GULLlVER, supra note 32, at 54. See Nogaj v. Nogaj, 352 Mich. 223, 89 N.W.2d 513 (1958)
(holding that bringing a suit for divorce, which was later withdrawn, was sufficient action
to assert a right of entry for condition broken); Mosca Town Co. v. Wellington, 39 Colo.
326, 89 P. 783 (1907) (holding that carrying off personal property from the land was
sufficient to exercise the right).
34 "[The happening of the event named in the special limitation is regarded as
terminating the estate by its own limitation and not by virtue of some extrinsic provision."
L. SIMES, supra note 27, at 28.
"[T]he determinable fee granted will automatically cease, and the property will
revert to the grantor or to his successor in interest." Id. at 28-29.
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limitations for an action to enforce a building restriction on real
property might read as follows:
No action shall be commenced or maintained to enforce the terms
of any building restriction concerning real property or to compel the
removal of any building or improvement on land because of the
violation of any terms of any building restrictions unless said action
is commenced within one year from the date of the violation for
which the action is sought to be brought or maintained3
This sort of statute would bar an action under a right of entry for
condition broken at the expiration of 1 year from the time of the
breach of the specified condition. The statute would have no
effect, however, on the possibility of reverter.37 Since a possibility
of reverter comes into effect automatically, the title to the land
reverts automatically, and no action by the holder of the possibil-
ity of reverter is necessary.
Yet the owner of land which was acquired through a possibil-
ity of reverter is not entirely safe. A possibility of reverter is not
itself subject to the type of 1-year statute set forth above. But if
after the title has reverted the former owner continues in posses-
sion, it may be held that his possession was sufficiently "open,
notorious, and hostile"3 to meet the requirements set forth in a
typical statute for adverse possession,3" or for adverse possession
with payment of taxes. 0 Title acquired through a possibility of
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-119 (1973) (emphasis added). Because of a 1972
change in the statute, it is no longer clear what statute of limitations applies to a right of
entry based on some condition other than a building restriction.
See School Dist. No. 6 v. Russell, 156 Colo. 75, 396 P.2d 929 (1964).
[fln spite of the School District's contention that the statute was a bar, and
the admitted fact that more than a year had elapsed between the cessation
of the use and the bringing of the action, the court sustained the possibility
of reverter. The necessary inference is that, as such, it was not affected by
the statute. This had never before been decided. It is not here expressed, but
there is no other way to account for the decision.
Marsh at 398.
38 See Van Zandt v. Chan, 7 Ariz. App. 360, 439 P.2d 523 (1968). But see Faus v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 146 Cal. App. 2d 370, 303 P.2d 814 (1956); Prince v. Charles Ilfeld Co.,
72 N.M. 351, 383 P.2d 827 (1963).
E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-101 (1973):
No person shall commence or maintain an action for the recovery of the title
or possession or to enforce or establish any right or interest of or to real
property or make an entry thereon unless commenced within eighteen years
after the right to bring such action or make such entry has first accrued or
within eighteen years after he or those from, by, or under whom he claims
have been seized or possessed of the premises. Eighteen years adverse posses-
sion of any land shall be conclusive evidence of absolute ownership.
E.g., id. § 38-41-108:
Every person in the actual possession of lands or tenements, under claim and
1975
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reverter is no more secure from termination by adverse possession
than any other title. But at least either statutory period required
for adverse possession is considerably longer than the 1-year stat-
ute applicable to the assertion of a right of entry for condition
broken.
The fourth major difference between the two interests arises
in connection with the question of alienability. In a jurisdiction
where it is held that neither interest may be alienated, the at-
tempted conveyance of the two interests will cause strikingly dif-
ferent results. The attempted conveyance of a possibility of rev-
erter will simply be held to be a nullity." It will not transfer
ownership of the possibility of reverter, nor will it have any effect
on the possibility of reverter itself.42 However, the attempted con-
veyance of a right of entry for condition broken will have a dra-
matic effect.
The ... doctrine, which has gained acceptance in most of the few
American jurisdictions wherein the point has received attention, is
that an attempted alienation of a right of re-entry extinguishes it,
and discharges the premises from the condition, notwithstanding
the alienee receives nothing because of the recognized rule against
alienation.43
Such a difference in the effect of the two interests clearly points
up the importance of distinguishing them. Moreover, a considera-
tion of Colorado case law concerning these interests will show
further significant differences (as well as a few similarities).
C. Alienability and Devisability in Colorado
The only time a right of entry for condition broken or a possi-
color of title, made in good faith, who for seven successive years continues
in such possession and also during said time pays all taxes legally assessed
on such lands or tenements shall be held and adjudged to be the legal owner
of said lands or tenements to the extent and according to the purport of his
paper title. All persons holding under such possession by purchase, devise,
or descent, before said seven years have expired, who continue such posses-
sion and continue to pay the taxes as provided in this section, so as to
complete the possession and payment of taxes for the term, provided in this
section, shall be entitled to the benefit of this section.
4' See Consolidated School Dist. v. Walter, 243 Minn. 159, 66 N.W.2d 881 (1954).
42 [E]ven in those jurisdictions in which a possibility of reverter is
considered to be inalienable, it is not, as has sometimes been held in regard
to a right of reentry, destroyed by an attempted alienation of it.
Note, Property-Fee Simple Determinables-Distinguishing Characteristics, 71 W. VA. L.
REV. 367, 374 (1969) (footnotes omitted). "No rule of extinguishment appears ever to have
been applied to an attempted transfer of a grantor's possibility of reverter." Annot., 53
A.L.R.2d 224, 229 (1957).
1 Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 224, 229 (1957).
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bility of reverter is specifically mentioned in the Colorado stat-
utes is in relation to mineral interests." This at least indicates
that the interests are recognized by statute. However, there is no
specific statutory provision regarding the characteristics of these
interests. Devisability and alienability of the interests are of par-
ticular concern because of their pragmatic importance, but these
qualities are not statutorily controlled.
With regard to devisability, prior to the new Colorado Pro-
bate Code, the applicable statutory provision merely stated that
every person of the age of eighteen years or more, being of sound
mind and memory, may execute a will and may devise and bequeath
real and personal property or any interest therein and by will may
exercise any power of appointment whether such power was created
before or after the effective date of this section.4 5
With the adoption of the new Colorado Probate Code, that provi-
sion has been shortened to the simple statement that, "[any
person eighteen years of age or older who is of sound mind may
make a will.""6 Neither under the old law nor under the new
Colorado Probate Code was specific reference made to the right
of entry for condition broken or to the possibility of reverter.
The Colorado statute dealing with alienability inter vivos is
similarly broad:
Any person, association of persons, or body politic or corporate,
which is entitled to hold real estate, or any interest in real estate
whatever, shall be authorized to convey the same to another or a
body corporate or politic by deed.'
Again, there is no specific reference to rights of entry for condition
broken or to possibilities of reverter.
Thus an examination of the case law is necessary. As indi-
cated above, it is not yet known whether a possibility of reverter
may be devised in Colorado. Nor is it clear whether a possibility
of reverter (while it is still a mere possibility) may be alienated,
although it is descendible. s
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-43-101 (1973).
45 Id. § 153-5-1 (1963).
4S Id. § 15-11-501 (1973).
'7 Id. § 38-30-101.
" School Dist. No. 6 v. Russell, 156 Colo. 75, 396 P.2d 929 (1964). Under either of
the theories, devise or inheritance, discussed above, the possibility of reverter must have
descended from Herbert A. Russell to Agnes F. Russell. The court also specifies, for the
first time in Colorado, which heirs take by descent. The court accepts the rule that "the
possibility of reverter is cast by descent upon the person's heirs, at the time of his death."
1975
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It is not yet known whether a right of entry for condition
broken may be devised. However, it has been decided that a right
of entry for condition broken may not be alienated in Colorado. 9
Union Colony Co. v. Gallie0 held that the mere attempt to convey
a right of entry for condition broken in Colorado permanently
extinguished the right. In that case, a corporation named Union
Colony had originally deeded a large part of the land now consti-
tuting the City of Greeley5 to various owners, subject to a right
of entry for condition broken in the grantor if liquor should ever
be "manufactured, sold or given away in any place of public
resort as a beverage, on said premises."52 Many years thereafter,
in 1929, the charter of the old corporation expired, and the Colo-
rado Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the right of
entry for condition broken passed under the statute to the trus-
tees of the old corporation.5" But in 1934 the trustees formed a new
corporation, for the express purpose, among other things, of hav-
ing the new corporation hold and be able to exercise the original
right of entry for condition broken. After the new corporation was
formed, the trustees of the old corporation duly attempted to
convey the right of entry for condition broken to the new corpora-
tion. Thereupon Katie Gallie brought an action to quiet title,
claiming that the right of entry for condition broken constituted
a cloud on her title and should be declared to be unenforceable.
The Colorado Supreme Court supported her contention, holding
that, "[alt common law, which was adopted in Colorado . . .
and which, in the absence of a statute otherwise providing, is in
force, the right of re-entry for condition broken. . . could not be
assigned. 5 4 The court went on to say that the trustees, "by such
conveyance . . . have destroyed the power in themselves if it ever
Id. at 82, 396 P.2d at 932. The rule that a possibility of reverter "rains down" on "those
who would qualify as heirs of the person creating the limitation as of the time when the
estate of his grantee is terminated" is rejected. Id.
"1 Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939).
50 Id.
5' Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 2, Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, id., asserts that,
Virtually all present titles to real property within the City of Greeley ...
are deraigned by mesne conveyances from THE UNION COLONY OF COL-
ORADO. . . .Virtually all UNION COLONY OF COLORADO convey-
ances of real property .. .in . . . Greeley contained a clause identical to
the clause quoted above.
This is not contradicted in any way by the Brief of Defendants in Error.
1 104 Colo. at 48, 88 P.2d at 121.
Id. at 55, 88 P.2d at 124.
Id. at 53, 88 P.2d at 123.
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existed. '5 Thus clear title was quieted in Gallie, and all the land
in the City of Greeley which had been subject to the particular
liquor clause was freed from that right of entry for condition
broken. 6 It was clearly established that a right of entry for condi-
tion broken is not alienable in Colorado, and that an attempted
conveyance destroys the right.
One other significant characteristic of rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter which is not controlled by Colorado stat-
ute should be considered-their ability under the common law to
endure forever. This quality of durability has been changed in
some jurisdictions by statute.5" It has been changed in Colorado
by case law.
D. Changed Conditions and Waiver in Colorado
In 1950 Dean Edward C. King published an excellent book
dealing with this subject entitled Future Interests in Colorado.8
But since that time the characteristics of a right of entry for
condition broken, and perhaps a possibility of reverter, have been
significantly changed in Colorado by the case of Cole v. Colorado
Springs Co.5" Under the orthodox rule, both a right of entry for
condition broken and a possibility of reverter are legal interests0
whose validity simply is not affected by changed conditions.' In
contrast, under a simple restrictive covenant in a deed (or the
similar interests known as affirmative or negative easements, or
equitable servitudes), the equitable defense of changed condi-
tions may be applied in certain circumstances.2 It should be kept
in mind that the basic difference between a covenant and a right
of entry for condition broken or a possibility of reverter is that a
covenant is a promise made between the grantor and the grantee,
5 Id. at 55, 88 P.2d at 124.
56 Id.
5 For examples of cases upholding such statutes see Blackert v. Dugosh, 12 Ill. 2d
171, 145 N.E.2d 606 (1957); Town of Brookline v. Carey, 355 Mass. 424, 245 N.E.2d 446
(1969).
5 E. KING, supra note 24.
11 152 Colo. 162, 381 P.2d 13 (1963).
6 "[I]f the land is subject to a legal restraint, i.e., a possibility of reverter or right
of entry, the power to refuse enforcement does not exist and forfeiture must be decreed."
Comment, Legislative Limitation of Reverter and Forfeiture Provisions in Conveyances
and Devises of Land-A Proposed Statute for Kansas, 15 KA. L. REv. 346, 348 (1967).
1I "[A] change of conditions which has eliminated the reason which prompted the
creation of a right of entry or possibility of reverter is supposed to be immaterial." Com-
ment, Future Interests-Effect of Change of Conditions on Rights of Entry and Possibili-
ties of Reverter Created to Control the Use of Land, 53 MICH. L. Rav. 246 (1954).
62 See, e.g., Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1882).
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but the right of entry for condition broken and the possibility of
reverter are property interests retained by the grantor, who has
parted with less than a fee simple absolute. The exact words of
the particular provision are extremely important in determining
whether a covenant, a right of entry for condition broken, or a
possibility of reverter has been established.
If the provision is found to constitute a covenant, against the
sale of liquor for example, and the subject land has subsequently
become the heart of the saloon district, the covenant might well
be unenforceable in equity because of changed conditions.A
Under the orthodox rule the changed conditions would have no
effect whatsoever on the enforceability of a right of entry for
condition broken or a possibility of reverter. 4
But Colorado departed from the orthodox rule in Cole v.
Colorado Springs Co. The final result in that case was that the
Colorado Supreme Court quieted title in the plaintiff, Cole,
thereby holding that the Colorado Springs Company would not
be permitted to enforce a "liquor clause" in its favor which had
been inserted by the company in the deed to Cole's predecessors
in title.65
This particular clause had become rather famous in Colo-
rado,"6 and had been upheld in 1879 by the Supreme Court of the
United States as a condition subsequent, 7 which would thus cre-
ate a right of entry for condition broken in the Colorado Springs
See Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959).
e' It should be noted, however, that in some jurisdictions forfeiture will be denied if
the court finds that there has been "substantial compliance" with the restrictions con-
tained in a grant creating a right of entry for condition broken or a possibility of reverter.
"Conditions of this sort . . . are not favored in the law and are to be construed strictly
against the grantor, . . and hence substantial compliance by the grantee is held to be
sufficient." Lassiter v. Town of Oxford, 243 F.2d 217, 218 (4th Cir. 1956). See also Board
of Comm'rs v. Russell, 174 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1949); J.M. Carey & Bros. v. City of Casper,
66 Wyo. 437, 213 P.2d 263 (1950).
15 The clause provided that
intoxicating liquors shall never be manufactured, sold or otherwise disposed
of as a beverage in any place of public resort, in or upon the premises hereby
granted. . . and it is herein and hereby expressly reserved by the said party
of the first part, that in case any of the above conditions concerning intoxi-
cating liquors are broken. . . then this deed shall become null and void, and
all right, title and interest, of, in, and to the premises hereby conveyed, shall
revert to the said party of the first part . . ..
152 Colo. at 166, 381 P.2d at 15.
11 E. KING, supra note 24, at 29. This restriction, according to King, "came to be
known as 'the Colorado Springs restriction.'"
11 Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55, 58 (1879).
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Company. In Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., however, the court
seemed unable to determine whether the clause created a right
of entry for condition broken or a possibility of reverter. In one
paragraph the court spoke of it as a possibility of reverter; 5 in
other paragraphs the court seemed to consider it a right of entry
for condition broken. 9 So it is by no means certain whether the
holding of the case applied to possibilities of reverter, rights of
entry for condition broken, or both.
Similarly, it is not entirely clear on what basis the court
reached its decision. Some of the cases relied upon, including the
Colorado case and three of the five cases from other jurisdictions,
simply do not hold what the Colorado court said that they hold.70
But after all, it is courts and legislatures, not law professors, who
make the law. So whatever the underlying reasoning may or may
not be, the Colorado Supreme Court announced some new law for
Colorado at the conclusion of Cole v. Colorado Springs Co. It
there stated: "[Ilf changed conditions and waiver make the con-
dition unenforceable in the present case, as we conclude they do,
we see no reason why title may not be quieted in this action
"I' Thus Colorado has turned away from the orthodox rule,
68 "[HIe has only a possibility of reverter." 152 Colo. at 167, 381 P.2d at 16.
" "Like language . . . was . . . held to establish a condition subsequent ....
Id. See also id. at 170, 381 P.2d at 17: "'a reversioner may waive a condition, and . . .
the breach does not of itself determine the grantee's estate without some act on the part
of the person entitled to take advantage of the forfeiture .... '"
" Storke v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 390 Ill. 619, 61 N.E.2d 552 (1945), specifically
avoids deciding that changed conditions would affect the enforceability of a right of entry
for condition broken. Instead, the court finds that there was no right of entry for condition
broken to begin with. "A breach of a condition subsequent does not revest title in the
original grantor or his heirs . . . and a court of equity will not aid a forfeiture where no
right of re-entry is provided in the covenant. . . . The deeds in question did not contain
a right of re-entry." Id. at 623, 61 N.E.2d at 556 (emphasis added). Lantz v. Pence, 127
Ind. App. 620, 142 N.E.2d 456 (1957), simply made no mention of possibilities of reverter,
rights of entry for condition broken, or of changed conditions. White v. Kentling, 345 Mo.
526, 134 S.W.2d 39 (1939), held that the interest involved was a possibility of reverter
which was still perfectly valid, and the issues discussed did not include changed condi-
tions. Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939), did not hold that
changed conditions had any effect on the right of entry for condition broken. It was the
attempted transfer of the right of entry for condition broken which extinguished it-a
perfectly orthodox rule.
In fact, of the six cases on which Cole purports to rely, only the two California cases,
Townsend v. Allen, 250 P.2d 292 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952), and Wedum-Aldahl Co. v.
Miller, 64 P.2d 762 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937), give any support to the position adopted
by the court in Cole. It does appear to be true that in California changed conditions may
defeat a right of entry for condition broken. But that hardly means that "courts have
generally" held that to be the rule.
11 152 Colo. at 173, 381 P.2d at 18-19.
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and held that a right of entry for condition broken, and/or a
possibility of reverter, may become unenforceable because of
changed conditions and/or waiver.
This may allow Cole v. Colorado Springs Co. to be added to
the list of "[riespectable authority [which] can be found for the
most varied and unpredictable positions,"7 or it may be a fortun-
ate judicial method of curtailing the potential power and duration
of rights of entry for condition broken and/or possibilities of rev-
erter. One might wish, however, that the court had been more
clear in its holding and in the basis therefor. In any case, under
the cases as they now stand in Colorado, rights of entry for condi-
tion broken and/or possibilities of reverter may become unen-
forceable because of changed conditions and/or waiver.
E. Possible Uses of These Interests
The City of Idaho Springs recently benefited substantially
through the use of a possibility of reverter.7 3 It was determined by
the city that it would be of benefit to Idaho Springs to have a
municipal swimming pool. The city was the owner of appropriate
land, but did not have the funds to build and operate a pool. Nor
did the city want to part with the land unless it could be assured
that the land would be developed in accordance with its plans for
the municipality. Centennial Properties, Inc. v. City of Littleton
74
held that a second-class city such as Idaho Springs did not have
the power to lease land owned by the city. Although it could sell
the land, it could not subject it to a lease. Idaho Springs therefore
arranged to convey the property by warranty deed to Overturf,
who agreed to build and maintain a pool. The deed contained a
provision that
the real property described herein, together with the improvements
thereon, shall be used perpetually and solely for the purpose. . . of
the operation of a swimming pool, which said restriction shall run
with the land 2 hereby conveyed and in the event of any breach
72 Comment, Future Interests-Effect of Change of Conditions on Rights of Entry and
Possibilities of Reverter Created to Control the Use of Land, 53 MICH. L. REv. 246, 263
(1954).
11 City of Idaho Springs v. Golden Say. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Colo. App. 119, 480 P.2d
847 (1970).
7, 154 Colo. 191, 390 P.2d 471 (1964).
71 Use of the words "shall run with the land," the phrase usually employed in cove-
nants, would seem to create an unnecessary risk that the provision might be interpreted
as a mere covenant. A clear possibility of reverter could have been set up by conveying
the land to Overturf "so long as it is used as a public pool, and no longer, and then to
revert to the grantor, or its successors in interest."
VOL. 52
DEVOLUTION OF A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
thereof, said property shall forthwith revert to the said party of the
first part, its successors and assigns.7"
This was held by the Colorado Court of Appeals, to which the case
was transferred by the Colorado Supreme Court," to set up a
possibility of reverter in the City of Idaho Springs.7" The court
also held that a second-class city does have power to make a
conveyance reserving a possibility of reverter.79 So although a
lease could not be used, a possibility of reverter was available and
effective.
Once Overturf got the land, he conveyed it to Overturf's
Park, Inc., which then executed a deed of trust on the subject
land to the Golden Savings and Loan Association. (Probably the
Golden Savings and Loan Association will not accept that sort of
security again.) When the deed of trust was ultimately foreclosed,
the property was not then being used for a swimming pool. So
after Golden Savings and Loan Association acquired a public
trustee's deed to the land," the City of Idaho Springs brought suit
to quiet title in itself. The courts upheld the possibility of rev-
erter, and Idaho Springs won.'
Another enlightening Colorado case was Mosca Town Co. v.
Wellington.2 In that case a tannery was built on land acquired
by a deed which provided that should the tannery ever cease to
operate, "the deed should thereupon become null and void, and
the title to said premises should thereupon revert to the grantor
... ," The tannery was built, then ceased operations and went
out of business, whereupon both the grantor of the land and a
local lumber dealer claimed "certain lumber, nails, and other
personal property" 4 which had been used to build the tannery.
The court held that the building, "built upon a substantial rock
foundation . . .became a fixture and part of the realty. 8 5 The
case indicates that in Colorado, a fixture which under local law
becomes part of the realty will go back with the land to the
76 City of Idaho Springs v. Golden Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 29 Colo. App. 119, 120-21, 480
P.2d 847-48 (1970).
7 Id. at 120, 480 P.2d at 847.
7' Id. at 122, 480 P.2d at 848.
Id. at 122, 480 P.2d at 849.
Id. at 121, 480 P.2d at 848.
Id. at 124, 480 P.2d at 849.
12 39 Colo. 326, 89 P. 783 (1907).
Id. at 328, 89 P. at 784.
Id. at 327, 89 P. at 784.
Id. at 328, 89 P. at 784.
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grantor in accordance with the provisions of the deed. This is
particularly significant because the value of such fixtures might
be considerably larger than "certain lumber and nails" and in
some cases might even be greater than the value of the land itself.
Rights of entry for condition broken and possibilities of rev-
erter have also been used on lands containing valuable minerals.
Needless to say, it is important to know the exact legal nature of
the mineral, oil, or gas interests one is attempting to acquire.
Normally, the attempted conveyance of a right of entry for condi-
tion broken would extinguish the right. In Colorado, however, the
purchaser of mineral rights has a good deal of statutory protec-
tion." Nevertheless,
[dJespite the perhaps hopeful desire of the present-day practitioner
to relegate the law of future interests to the classroom as a subject
of academic interest alone, a knowledge of the general principles in
this field is mandatory for the oil and gas attorney ... until, as is
frequently the case, a dry hole solves the problem once and for all."
CONCLUSION
A right of entry for condition broken is usually created by
such words as "but if," giving the grantor a right to reenter the
premises if the condition is broken. This right of entry for condi-
tion broken must be asserted, and is subject to the 1-year statute
of limitations. It is not subject to the Rule against Perpetuities,
nor is it alienable. An attempted alienation of the right of entry
for condition broken will extinguish the right. It may also become
unenforceable because of changed conditions and/or waiver. It is
not known whether it is devisable or not.
A possibility of reverter, on the other hand, is usually created
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-43-101 (1973):
Where lands in this state, or any estate or interest therein, are subject to
contingent future interests, legal or equitable, whether arising by way of
remainder, reversion, possibility of reverter, executory devise, upon the hap-
pening of a condition subsequent, or otherwise, created by deed, will, or other
instrument. . . and it is made to appear that it will be advantageous to the
present and ultimate owners of said lands or any estate or interest therein
that such lands, estate or interest be leased for the production of minerals
... upon the filing of a complaint by any person having a vested, contin-
gent, or possible interest in said lands, or any estate or interest therein ...
the district . . . court . . . shall have the . . . power . . . pending the
happening of any contingency and the vesting of such future interest, to
appoint a trustee for such lands, or any estate or interest therein, and to
authorize and direct such trustee to sell, execute, and deliver a valid lease
covering the minerals ....
'7 Mosburg, Oil and Gas, and the Defeasible Fee, 12 OKLA. L. Rv. 233, 263-64 (1959).
VOL. 52
DEVOLUTION OF A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
by words indicating the duration of the estate conveyed, by such
words as "so long as." When the terminating event happens, e.g.,
the premises are no longer used for school purposes, the full legal
title to the land reverts automatically to the grantor. Thus al-
though the 1-year statute of limitations is inapplicable to a possi-
bility of reverter, the title gained thereby may be subject to the
provisions of the statutes dealing with adverse possession. The
possibility of reverter is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties. It is not yet known whether it may be alienated or devised,
although it has been determined to be descendible. It, too, may
become unenforceable because of changed conditions and/or
waiver.
In many instruments, because of the inaccuracy of the lan-
guage used, it is difficult to determine which interest has been
created. Probably the most workable test is that suggested by The
American Law of Property, emphasizing the purpose of the re-
striction.
If the purpose is to compel compliance with a condition by the
penalty of forfeiture, an estate on condition arises [which leaves a
right of entry for condition broken in the grantor], but if the intent
is to give the land for a stated use, the estate to cease when that use
or purpose is ended, no penalty for a breach of condition is involved,
since the purpose is . . . to convey the property for so long as it is
needed . . . and no longer. . ..
which leaves a possibility of reverter in the grantor.
Determining which interest has been created is important
because their legal effects can be strikingly different. The finan-
cial value of interests subject to a right of entry for condition
broken or a possibility of reverter may be substantial. 9 The effect
of either provision, suddenly shifting title from one holder to an-
other, is likely to be quite dramatic.
m 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.6, at 97 (1957).
" The interests themselves may have value, particularly in condemnation. State v.
Independent School Dist., 266 Minn. 85, 123 N.W.2d 121 (1963). But see State v. Cooper,
24 N.J. 261, 131 A.2d 756 (1957), holding that "if at the time of taking the 'event ripening
the right of reverter is not imminent, the owner of the estate in fee simple defeasible is
entitled to all the compensation.'" Tax questions may be involved. Board of Comm'rs v.
City of Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 P. 301 (1919); In re Terry's Estate, 218 N.Y.
218, 112 N.E. 931, 157 N.Y.S. 1147 (1916).
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